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Abstract
We demonstrate that state-of-the-art optical character
recognition (OCR) based on deep learning is vulnerable
to adversarial images. Minor modifications to images of
printed text, which do not change the meaning of the text
to a human reader, cause the OCR system to “recognize”
a different text where certain words chosen by the ad-
versary are replaced by their semantic opposites. This
completely changes the meaning of the output produced
by the OCR system and by the NLP applications that use
OCR for preprocessing their inputs.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) techniques based on deep neu-
ral networks have led to major advances in the state of
the art for many image analysis tasks, including object
classification [29] and face recognition [52]. Modern
ML models, however, are vulnerable to adversarial ex-
amples [50]: a minor modification to an input image, of-
ten imperceptible to a human, can change the output of
an ML model applied to this image, e.g., produce an in-
correct classification [10, 16, 42, 50] or cause the model
to segment the image incorrectly [12].
Optical character recognition (OCR) is another image
analysis task where deep learning has led to great im-
provements in the quality of ML models. It is different
from image classification in several essential ways.
First, modern OCR models are not based on classify-
ing individual characters. Instead, they assign sequences
of discrete labels (corresponding to entire words) to
variable-sized inputs. Consequently, they recognize text
line by line, as opposed to character by character. This
presents a challenge for the adversary because, as we
show, attacks that simply paste adversarial images of in-
dividual characters into an input image are ineffective
against the state-of-the-art models.
Second, many applications of OCR involve recogniz-
Input image OCR output
⇒ YRE-991
↓ add perturbation
⇒ YPF-881
Figure 1: An adversarial example for an OCR-based li-
cense plate recognition system. The OCR model takes a
variable-sized image as input and outputs a sequence of
characters that occur in the image. This task is different
from image classification.
ing natural-language text (e.g., contents of a scanned
document) and not just arbitrary sequences of characters
(as in the example of Fig. 1). In this context, small per-
turbations to the input image typically cause the OCR
model to reject the input or else produce meaningless
output. The search for adversarial examples should be
guided by linguistic information—in our case, pairs of
words that are visually similar yet semantically opposite.
Some aspects of the OCR task favor the adversary.
When the goal of OCR is to recognize natural-language
text, incorrectly recognizing even a single world can have
a big impact on the overall meaning of the text. An ad-
versary who can effect a very small targeted change in
the model’s output—for example, replace a well-chosen
word with its antonym—can completely change how a
human would understand the resulting text.
Third, OCR systems are often used as components of
natural language processing (NLP) pipelines. Their out-
put is fed into NLP applications such as document cat-
egorization and summarization. This amplifies the im-
pact of adversarial examples because NLP applications
are highly sensitive to certain words in their input. As
we show, tiny changes to input images can dramatically
change the output of the NLP models operating on the
results of OCR applied to these images. Further, many
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NLP models are trained on OCR-processed documents.
If some of these training inputs are replaced by adversar-
ial images, the adversary can poison the model.
Our contributions. We investigate the power of adver-
sarial examples against Tesseract [53], a popular OCR
system based on deep learning. We chose Tesseract be-
cause a trained model is publicly available (as opposed to
just the model architecture) and also because Tesseract is
used in many OCR-based applications.
We show how to generate adversarial images of indi-
vidual words that cause Tesseract to misrecognize them
as their antonyms, effectively flipping their meaning. We
then extend word-level attacks to entire documents. Us-
ing the corpus of Hillary Clinton’s emails for our exper-
iments, we show how to (1) modify key data, including
dates, times, numbers, and addresses, and (2) change a
few chosen words to their antonyms, completely chang-
ing the meaning of the text produced by OCR vs. the
meaning of the text in the original document.
We then evaluate our attack on NLP applications that
rely on OCR to extract text from images. We show
that adversarial text images can fool a semantic analy-
sis model into confidently producing wrong predictions.
For a document categorization model, the adversary can
generate text images that, after being processed by OCR,
will be misclassified into any target class chosen by the
adversary. We also show how adversarial images can poi-
son the training data and degrade the performance of a
sentiment analysis model.
The adversarial perturbations needed to stage success-
ful attacks against Tesseract (a) affect only a tiny fraction
of the pixels in the input image, and (b) are localized in
a small subregion of the image, corresponding to the few
words being attacked. Furthermore, (c) large documents
present many opportunities for an attack: the adversary
has many choices of words to modify in order to change
the meaning of the resulting text.
Limitations of our attack include transferability and
physical realizability. In general, perturbations needed to
make adversarial text images physically realizable are so
big that the resulting images are rejected by Tesseract as
too noisy. Nevertheless, we demonstrate an adversarial
word image that fools Tesseract into recognizing a se-
mantically opposite word even after this image is printed
onto paper and scanned back into a digital form.
2 Background
2.1 Deep learning for sequence labeling
Deep learning has become very popular for many com-
puter vision and image recognition tasks [29, 52]. A
deep learning model (or “neural network”) is a function
fθ : X 7→ Y parametrized by θ , where X is the input, or
feature, space and Y is the output space. For classifica-
tion problems, X is a vector space (e.g., images of the
same size) and Y is a discrete set of classes (e.g., the set
of possible objects in the images). Supervised training
of a model fθ aims to find the best set of parameters θ
using the labeled training dataset D = {(xi, ti)}i and the
loss metric L( f (xi), ti), which measures the gap between
the model’s prediction f (xi) and the correct label ti.
Sequence labeling is a more complicated task that as-
signs a sequence of discrete labels to variable-sized se-
quential input data. For example, in optical character
recognition, the input is an image and the output is a se-
quence of characters t = [t1, t2, . . . , tN ], t i ∈ Γ from some
alphabet Γ. Both the input image and the output text can
vary in length, and the alignment of image regions to the
corresponding text characters is not known a priori.
Connectionist Temporal Classification (CTC) [20]
provides a alignment-free method for training an end-to-
end neural network for sequence labeling tasks. In CTC,
the neural-network model f outputs a sequence of prob-
ability vectors f (x) = y = [y1,y2, . . . ,yM] where M ≥ N
and yi ∈ [0,1]|Γ| is the probability distribution over all
characters at position i.
Training the model requires calculating the likelihood
p(t|x). Because M is not necessarily the same as N, it
is hard to directly measure p(t|x) from the model’s pre-
diction f (x) and the target sequence t. Instead, p(t|x)
is measured using a valid alignment a of t. Sequence
a = [a1,a2, . . . ,aM] and ai ∈ Γ∪{blank} is a valid align-
ment of t if a can be turned into t by removing blanks
and sequential duplicate characters. For example, [c, a,
a, blank, t, t] is a valid alignment for [c, a, t].
Let A be the set of all possible valid alignments of
length M for the target sequence t. Then the likelihood is
p(t|x) = ∑
a∈A
∏
i=1,M
p(ai|x) = ∑
a∈A
∏
i=1,M
(yi)ai
The CTC loss function for the model prediction f (x) and
the target sequence t is
LCTC( f (x), t) =− log p(t|x) (1)
The training then proceeds as usual to minimize the CTC
loss on all training inputs.
The resulting model, given an input x, produces f (x).
To obtain the most probable output sequence, a greedy
algorithm can select argmax yi at each position i and
collapse the alignment (i.e., eliminate blanks and dupli-
cates). The greedy method, however, does not account
for the fact that a sequence can have many valid align-
ments. A better method is based on beam search decod-
ing: keep a fixed number of the most probable align-
ments at each position i and return the (collapsed) out-
put that has the highest sum of probabilities for all valid
alignments in the top-alignment list.
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Figure 2: OCR pipeline with a deep learning-based recognition model. The OCR system first performs page layout
analysis (PLA) to detect the text in the image and segments the image into sub-images containing one line of text each.
Each line image is scaled and normalized to match the training data of the recognition model. The normalized line
images are fed into the recognition model. Finally, the OCR system outputs combined text predictions.
2.2 Optical character recognition
Optical character recognition (OCR) is a technology that
converts images of handwritten or printed text (e.g., a
scanned document, a page of magazine, or even a photo
of a scene that includes signs with text) into digital text.
The OCR pipeline generally starts with preprocessing
the images. Common preprocessing techniques include
page layout analysis for localizing blocks of texts in the
image, de-skewing the image if the text is not aligned
properly, and segmenting the image to extract blocks or
regions that contain text. A recognition model is then
applied to the preprocessed images. The characters pro-
duced by the model are the output of the OCR pipeline.
Recognition models can be roughly categorized into
two types: character-based and end-to-end.
Character-based recognition is the traditional ap-
proach to recognizing text in the “block of text” images.
Examples of character-based OCR include GOCR [15]
and the legacy version of Tesseract [48]. A character
recognition model first localizes characters in the image
and segments the image into sub-images that contain one
character each. The model then extracts features from
each sub-image and feeds them into a machine learning
classifier to identify the most likely character. The fea-
tures are usually hand-engineered and may include, for
example, lines, closed loops, line directions and inter-
sections, etc. The classifier is typically a fairly simple
ML model such as K-nearest neighbors.
The performance of the classifier severely degrades
if the single-character images produced by the segmen-
tation are bad. Therefore, the overall performance of
character-based recognition models strongly depends on
the segmentation method.
End-to-end recognition is a segmentation-free tech-
nique that aims to recognize entire sequences of charac-
ters in a variable-sized “block of text” image. Sequential
models such as Hidden Markov Models have been used
for this purpose [7, 13, 33].
With the recent advances in deep learning for image
analysis, end-to-end recognition models based on deep
neural networks [8, 59] have become increasingly pop-
ular. These models utilize neural networks as the fea-
ture extractor and thus do not require that features be
manually engineered. Sequential deep neural-network
layer name layer specs layer output shape
conv2d 3×3×16 h×w×16
maxpool2d 3×3 h/3×w/3×16
lstm-fys 64 w/3×64
lstm-fx 96 w/3×96
lstm-rx 96 w/3×96
lstm-fx 512 w/3×512
fc 111 w/3×111
Table 1: Neural network architecture1of Tesseract’s text
recognition model.
models [20, 22] also allow variable-sized input images
and thus avoid the issues that arise from segmentation in
character-based models.
OCR applications. OCR is widely used for many real-
world applications, including automated data entry and
license plate recognition [39]. OCR can also serve as the
main preprocessing step for natural language processing
(NLP) tasks such as text classification [2, 31, 63], docu-
ment retrieval [17, 26, 51], machine translation [19, 62],
and even cancer classification [66]. All of these ap-
plications critically depend on the correctness of OCR
because the consequences of mistakes are very seri-
ous—from wrong cars being fined for violations to in-
correct medical diagnoses.
2.3 Tesseract
We chose Tesseract for our investigation because it
is one of the most widely used open-source OCR sys-
tems [53] and because a trained model is available
(as opposed to just the architecture). The legacy ver-
sion of Tesseract [48] uses a character-based recognition
model, but we focus on the latest version of Tesseract
which uses an end-to-end deep learning-based recogni-
tion model [49, 56]. The OCR pipeline of the latest ver-
sion of Tesseract follows the flow chart in Fig. 2.
Tesseract takes an image as input and performs page
layout analysis to find the regions that contains text. Each
region is then segmented into images of individual lines
1Details of the model specification are described in https://
github.com/tesseract-ocr/tesseract/wiki/VGSLSpecs
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of text. These line images are then fed to the deep learn-
ing model for text recognition.
Tesseract’s recognition model takes a line image as
input and outputs a sequence of characters recognized
in that line. This line recognition task is essentially a
sequence labeling problem where the input images can
vary in width. Tesseract adds a small preprocessing step
that scales and normalizes line images to match the input
domain of Tesseract’s training data.
The overall architecture of Tesseract’s deep learning
model is given in Table 1. Inputs are gray-scaled im-
ages of size h×w. The network starts with convolu-
tion layer (conv2d) with a 3× 3× 16 filter and tanh ac-
tivation function, followed by a 3×3 max-pooling layer
(maxpool2d). The network is then stacked with 4 long
short-term memory [22] (lstm) layers with, respectively,
64, 96, 96, and 512 hidden units. An LSTM layer can
have several modes (shown in letters after the dash): f/r
means forward/reverse pass, x/y indicates if the direction
of pass is horizontal or vertical, s indicates whether it re-
turns only the last step of LSTM outputs. Finally, the out-
put layer has 111 units, corresponding to the number of
possible English characters. Therefore, the network pro-
duces w/3 probability vectors of size 111. Given these
vectors, Tesseract outputs the most probable sequence of
characters by beam-search decoding.
Tesseract’s model has been trained on documents ren-
dered from a large-scale text corpus crawled from the
Internet [54]. The parameters of the trained model are
available online [55].
2.4 Adversarial examples
Many machine learning models are vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples [10, 16, 42, 50]. For instance, in object
classification tasks, a small perturbation—perhaps even
imperceptible to the human eye—can cause the model to
classify an image containing an object of a certain type
as a different type with high confidence.
More formally, given a model f that maps an input x to
an output prediction t, the adversary can perform either
an untargeted attack, or a targeted attack. For the untar-
geted attack, the goal of the adversary is to generate an
adversarial example x′ so that f (x′) 6= t. For the targeted
attack, the adversary has a specific target output t ′ 6= t in
mind. His goal is to construct an adversarial example x′
so that f (x′) = t ′. For both types of attacks, D(x,x′) must
be below some threshold where D is a distance metric
that measures similarity between two inputs.
Constructing adversarial examples is usually formu-
lated as an optimization problem. For a machine learning
task, the loss function L measures the error between the
true target t and model’s prediction f (x). The problem of
generating an untargeted adversarial example for a valid
input x with the distance threshold ε can be stated as:
max
x′ L( f (x
′), t)
such that D(x,x′)≤ ε
Maximizing the loss term “forces” the model to make a
wrong prediction given x′ while the distance to the valid
input is below ε .
For a targeted attack, the objective is L( f (x′), t ′),
which forces the model to predict t ′ instead of t.
The optimization problem is typically solved using
standard gradient descent. Given access to the param-
eters of the model, the gradient with respect to the adver-
sarial input can be calculated using back-propagation.
Previous literature considered adversarial examples
for standard image classification tasks. In Section 3.2,
we explain why generating adversarial examples for
OCR models is more difficult.
3 Attacking OCR Pipeline
3.1 Threat model
We assume that the adversary has complete access to the
entire OCR pipeline, including the preprocessing algo-
rithms, the architecture and parameters of the recogni-
tion model, the decoding algorithm, and—when the out-
put of OCR is used as input into NLP applications—the
machine learning models used by the latter.
This assumption holds for Tesseract, as well as other
open-source OCR systems. Prior work has also shown
that it is sometimes possible to generate adversarial ex-
amples in a black-box scenario where the adversary does
not know the core recognition model and its parame-
ters [41]. Other steps of the pipeline, including prepro-
cessing, are standardized in many systems and thus easy
for the adversary to reconstruct.
3.2 Generating targeted adversarial exam-
ples for CTC-based OCR
As described in Section 2, Tesseract (and other OCR sys-
tems) performs sequence labeling. Model f takes image
x as input and produces a sequence of characters t as its
output or “prediction.”
An untargeted attack in this case will cause the model
predict a sequence of characters that does not match the
ground truth (i.e., the characters that actually appear in
the input image). If, however, the output of OCR is
intended to be human-understandable natural text, the
untargeted attack may produce a sequence of gibberish
characters that does not form a valid text.
Instead, we focus on targeted attacks that cause the
model to predict an adversary-specified sequence of
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characters t ′ which is a valid text whose semantic
meaning is different from the ground truth.
Given an input image x, the ground truth sequence t,
and the target sequence t ′, we use the standard formula-
tion of the optimization problem to generate an adversar-
ial example x′ [50]:
min
x′
c ·LCTC( f (x′), t ′)+ ||x− x′||22
such that x′ ∈ [xmin,xmax]p
where LCTC is the CTC loss function for sequential label-
ing detailed in Equation (1) and ||x−x′||22 is the L2-norm
distance between the clean and perturbed images, and the
constant c balances the two terms in the loss function.
The box constraint x′ ∈ [xmin,xmax]p where p is the
number of pixels ensures that the adversarial example is
a valid input for f . In Tesseract, xmin,xmax are −1,1, re-
spectively. Using the change of variables method [10],
we reformulate the minimization problem as:
min
ω
c ·LCTC( f (α · tanh(ω)+β2 ), t
′)
+ ||α · tanh(ω)+β
2
− x||22
where x′ = (α · tanh(ω)+β )/2, α = (xmax−xmin)/2 and
β = (xmax + xmin)/2. This formulation adds a new vari-
able ω so that (α · tanh(ω)+β )/2 satisfies the box con-
straint automatically during optimization.
Differences between attacking CTC and attacking
classification. Generating targeted adversarial exam-
ples for the sequence labeling models differs in sev-
eral respects from attacking standard image classifica-
tion models, which were the subject of much prior re-
search [10, 50].
First, the output of a CTC model is a varied-length
sequence instead of a single label. A successful tar-
geted attack thus needs to ensure that the output sequence
matches the target sequence exactly in terms of length
and each label in the sequence. This is harder than attack-
ing the standard image classification task, which requires
transforming a single label produced by the model.
Second, a successful attack on a label in a given se-
quence may not work in a different context. For exam-
ple, suppose we have an adversarial example that causes
include to be misrecognized as exclude, where we only
changed letters in to letters ex. The perturbation on the
letters in may not work when applied to other words, e.g.,
it may not cause internally to be misrecognized as exter-
nally. This is due to the nature of the recurrent neural
networks used in the CTC recognition model. Their in-
ternal feature representations depend on the context and
the same perturbation may not transfer between contexts.
To the best of our knowledge, adversarial examples
against sequence labeling models have not been previ-
ously demonstrated in the image domain. Concurrent
work developed targeted attacks against speech-to-text
models [11]; we discuss the differences in Section 7.
3.3 Basic attack
OCR is widely used for tasks such as processing scanned
documents and data entry, where the output of OCR is
intended to be understandable by humans. The targeted
attack from Section 3.2 can easily modify data such as
dates, addresses, numbers, etc., with serious impact on
documents such as invoices and contracts.
A more interesting attack takes advantage of the fact
that OCR produces natural-language text. This attack
transforms the meaning of the output text by causing the
OCR model to misrecognize a few key words.
Choosing target word pairs. In languages such as En-
glish, there are pairs of words that are very far in meaning
but visually close enough that a small adversarial pertur-
bation is sufficient to fool the OCR system into recogniz-
ing an image of one word as the other word.
One simple attack that can help transform the mean-
ing of a text is to replace a key word with its antonym.
To create a list of word pairs for our experiments, we
collected pairs of antonyms from the WordNet dictio-
nary [37] where the distance between two words in a
pair is below a threshold. In the experiments, we set the
threshold adaptively according to the number of charac-
ters in the word. We also make sure the replaced word
is the same part of speech as the original word. This en-
sures that the attack does not introduce (new) grammatic
errors into the text output by the OCR model.
Semantic filtering. Although replacing a word with its
antonym does not cause syntactic errors, it may still
cause semantic awkwardness in the transformed text.
There are several reasons for this.
First, an English word can have multiple meanings,
thus simply replacing a word with one of its antonyms
many not fit the context. For example, changing “They
carelessly fired the barn.” to “They carelessly hired the
barn.” turns the sentence into nonsense. This issue can
be potentially addressed using language modeling. The
adversary can check the linguistic likelihood of the trans-
formed text and, if it is very low, do not apply the attack.
In the above example, the phrase hired the barn should
have a low score because it is rare—although not entirely
absent—in English-language corpuses.
If the document contains multiple sentences, the re-
placement word may not fit the context of the whole doc-
ument even if its meaning is indeed the opposite of the
word it replaced. The modified sentence may not follow
the logic of the surrounding sentences. For example, the
attack can change “I am glad that . . . ” to “I am sad that
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. . . ”. However, if the context around this sentence sug-
gests a positive feeling, this replacement will look very
awkward. Changing the entire context may not be feasi-
ble if it requires careful paraphrasing rather than simply
replacing individual words.
Checking the semantic smoothness of a transformed
document is a non-trivial task. As suggested in [25], it
may be possible to use crowd-sourcing to decide if the
transformed document makes sense or not.
Generating adversarial text images. Given the original
text of the document, first render a clean image. Then
find words in the text that appear in the list of antonym
pairs (see above). Locate the lines of the clean image
containing the words to be transformed, transform them,
and keep only the transformations that produce valid
words and pass semantic filtering (i.e., do not produce
semantic inconsistencies in the resulting text). Then gen-
erate adversarial examples for these line images and re-
place the images of the corresponding lines in the doc-
ument image. The OCR model with recognize all lines
of the image correctly except for the modified lines. For
the modified lines, the model will output the correct text
with some of the words replaced by their antonyms.
3.4 Fooling NLP applications
OCR systems are often used as just one component in a
bigger pipeline, which passes their output to applications
operating on the natural-language text (e.g., document
categorization or summarization). These pipelines are a
perfect target for the adversarial-image attacks because
the output of OCR is not intended to be read or checked
by a human. Therefore, the adversary does not need to
worry about the syntactic or semantic correctness of the
OCR output as long as this output has the desired effect
on the NLP application that operates on it.
Generating adversarial text for NLP models. We pro-
vide a simple greedy algorithm (Algorithm 1) to auto-
matically generate, given the original text t, the target
text t? that we want the OCR system to produce as out-
put. This target text will serve as input to an NLP classi-
fier h so that the class predicted by h(t?) will be different
from the correct prediction h(t). For simplicity, we as-
sume that h is a binary classifier where h(t) is the score
for how likely the input is to be classified as the correct
class, e.g., the probability in a logistic regression model
or distance to the hyperplane in an SVM.
We first find the optimal replacement for each word w
in t. We select the candidate set of replacement words
W so that the edit distance between w and each word
in W is below some threshold τ . The restriction on the
edit distance allows us to use smaller perturbations when
generating adversarial text images. We then compute the
Algorithm 1 Generating target text for NLP classifier
1: Input: NLP classifier h, victim text t, vocabulary V ,
edit-distance threshold τ , model failure criterion
2: Output: Modified target text t? or failure ⊥
3: R← /0 . set of word replacements
4: for each word w in x do
5: W ←{w′|w′ ∈V,edit-distance(w,w′)≤ τ}
6: T ←{t ′|t with w replaced by w′,w′ ∈W}
7: ∆←{δ |δ = h(t ′)−h(t), t ′ ∈ T}
8: if min∆< 0 then
9: w′← word replaced in argmint∆
10: δ ←min∆
11: R← R∪{(w,w′,δ )}
12: end if
13: end for
14: Sort R by absolute value of δ in descending order.
15: t?← t
16: for (w,w′,δ ) ∈ R do
17: Replace w in t? with w′
18: if h(t?) meets model failure criterion then
19: return t?
20: end if
21: end for
22: return ⊥
scores on the modified texts where w is replaced by each
w′ ∈W . We select w′ that biases the original score h(t)
the most as the optimal replacement for w.
We then sort all optimal word replacements in de-
scending order by the changes they cause in the score.
The goal is to identify words that are most influential
in changing the prediction of the NLP model. We then
greedily modify t to t?, replacing the most influential
words by their optimal replacements, and repeat the pro-
cedure until h(t?) meets some model failure criterion
(e.g., the score is below some threshold or the model pre-
diction is wrong).
This approach easily generalizes to multi-class mod-
els, whose output h(t) is a k-dimensional vector where k
is the number of classes. If we want the model to incor-
rectly predict class i as j, we modify Algorithm 1 to se-
lect word replacements that maximize δ = h(t ′) j−h(t) j
and keep the rest of the algorithm unchanged.
Generating adversarial text images. We first render a
clean image based on the original text t. We run Algo-
rithm 1 on t to obtain the adversarial text t?. We then
locate the lines of the clean image where the texts needs
to be modified. As in the basic attack, we generate the
adversarial examples for these lines and replace the orig-
inal lines with the generated images.
Data poisoning attacks. OCR is often used as a prepro-
cessing step for collecting raw data to train NLP mod-
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els [2, 51]. Our attack can contaminate the raw text im-
ages used as part of the training data and thus affect the
performance of the trained model.
We assume that the adversary has access to the raw
text images and can modify a subset of these images. He
first trains a benign NLP model h0 based on the OCR out-
put on clean images. He then uses Algorithm 1 to gen-
erate adversarial texts for a subset of the training texts
based on h0. He then generates adversarial images ac-
cordingly and uses them to replace the clean images. The
adversarial images look benign but the texts extracted
from them by the OCR model are different from the orig-
inal texts. The final NLP model will be trained on the
adversarial texts and thus its performance will degrade.
4 Experiments
4.1 Setup
We used the latest Tesseract version 4.00 alpha, which
employs the deep learning model described in Table 1 for
recognition. We downloaded the parameters of Tesser-
act’s recognition model and loaded them into our Tensor-
flow [1] implementation of the same recognition model.2
We implemented the attack described in Section 3.2 with
the Adam optimizer [28], generated adversarial exam-
ples using our Tensorflow implementation, and evaluated
them by directly applying Tesseract.
4.2 Attacking single words
We selected 120 pairs of antonyms from WordNet [37]
that meet our threshold requirement on the edit distance.
We set the threshold adaptively according to the number
of characters in the word (2, 3, or 4 if the number of char-
acters is, respectively, 5 or less, 6 to 9, or above 9). Some
examples of the pairs in our list are presence/absence, su-
periority/inferiority, disabling/enabling, defense/offense,
and ascend/descend.
We render these words with 16 common fonts and set
their antonyms as the target output. We set the number
of iterations of gradient descent to 1,000, step size for
optimization to 0.01, and the constant c in the objective
function to 20. Some of the resulting adversarial images
are shown in Fig. 3. The perturbation is very minor but
the output of Tesseract is the opposite of the word ap-
pearing in the image.
The overall results for the word-pairs attack are sum-
marized in Table 2. The performance of the attack varies
for different fonts, but for most fonts we can successfully
cause over 90% of the words in our list to be misrecog-
2The implementation is copied from the scripts available at https:
//github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/
street with minor modifications to take advantage of GPUs.
Font Clean acc Target acc Rejected Avg L2
Arial 100.00% 94.17% 0.00% 3.10
Arial B 100.00% 96.67% 0.00% 3.27
Arial BI 100.00% 95.00% 0.00% 3.14
Arial I 99.17% 94.17% 0.83% 2.90
Courier 99.17% 79.17% 0.00% 2.73
Courier B 100.00% 96.67% 0.00% 3.36
Courier BI 100.00% 93.33% 0.00% 3.23
Courier I 99.17% 93.33% 0.83% 2.78
Georgia 100.00% 91.67% 0.83% 2.94
Georgia B 100.00% 94.17% 0.83% 3.18
Georgia BI 100.00% 92.50% 0.83% 3.03
Georgia I 100.00% 95.00% 0.00% 2.99
Times NR 100.00% 88.33% 0.00% 2.90
Times NR B 100.00% 91.67% 0.00% 3.04
Times NR BI 98.33% 96.67% 0.00% 2.81
Times NR I 96.67% 90.00% 0.00% 2.75
Table 2: Results of attacking single words rendered with
different fonts (B indicates bold, I indicates italic). Clean
acc is the accuracy of Tesseract (percentage of predic-
tions that match the ground truth) on clean images. Tar-
get accuracy is the accuracy of Tesseract predicting the
target word (antonym) on adversarial images. Rejected is
the percentage of adversarial images that are rejected by
Tesseract due to large perturbation. Avg L2 is the average
L2 distance between clean and adversarial images.
nized as their antonyms. The amount of perturbation as
measured by the L2 distance is similar for different fonts.
If too much perturbation is applied to an image, Tesseract
rejects the input and does not output anything.
4.3 Attacking whole documents
We now illustrate how our attack works for the images
of whole documents, using documents from the publicly
available corpus of Hillary Clinton’s emails3.
Changing key data in text. We first show how our attack
can be used to change key data (e.g., names, numbers and
addresses) in a document. We chose a document from the
corpus that contains such information and rendered it as
a clean image. We then set the target output according to
the type of information (name to a different name, date
to a different date etc). Some care must be taken when
choosing the target values in order to preserve seman-
tic consistency. For example, if the ground-truth text is
Tuesday, May 19, then the target Thursday, May 18 is not
semantically valid because the day of the week and the
actual date do not match.
Fig. 4 (a) shows an example of a successful attack,
which changes the recognized date, time, and name in-
formation with a small perturbation on the document im-
age. This shows a potential risk for OCR systems used
3Hillary Clinton’s emails corpus is available at https://www.
kaggle.com/kaggle/hillary-clinton-emails/data
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Ground truth Clean image Adversarial image OCR output Perturbation
hire fire
glad sad
waning waxing
dissent assent
overtly covertly
ascend descend
asymmetrical symmetrical
appreciation depreciation
Figure 3: Adversarial renderings of words misrecognized as their antonyms by Tesseract. Perturbation is the absolute
difference between the clean and adversarial images.
for data entry from scanned images, where the output
of OCR is not structured natural language but discrete
pieces of information.
Changing semantic meaning of text. We can also
change the meaning of a document using the antonym
pairs from the word-level attacks. Although our antonym
list is very short, these words are frequently used. For
example, in Hillary Clinton’s email corpus, words from
our antonym list occur in 2,207 out of 7,945 emails, with
each email contains on average 3.05 words from our list.
We show an example of a successful attack in Fig. 4
(b), where the text output by Tesseract conveys a mean-
ing opposite to the original email. The original email
expresses the idea that the U.S. will increase its forces in
a NATO-led operation, and so will its allies. We ren-
der an adversarial text image so as to cause Tesseract
to output increase instead of decrease in two key posi-
tions. The text “recognized” by Tesseract now expresses
the idea that U.S. will decrease the commitment while
the allies will increase theirs, which is the exact opposite
of the meaning of the original email. This illustrates how
the meaning of a relatively long document can be flipped
with a well-chosen change to one or two words.
4.4 Attacking NLP applications
We now demonstrate that our attack can significantly af-
fect NLP applications if they operate on the results of
OCR applied to text images.
Sentiment analysis. Sentiment analysis is a binary
classification task to determine whether the input text
contains positive or negative sentiment. We chose
Rotten Tomatoes (RT) [40] and IMDB movie review
datasets [34] for evaluation. For the RT dataset, we train
a logistic regression classifier with bag-of-word features.
For the IMDB dataset, we train a convolutional neu-
ral network (CNN) with word embedding features [27].
Given an input text, both models output a confidence
score for the polarity of sentiment in the input text. The
logistic regression model achieves 78.4% accuracy on
RT’s test data and the CNN model achieves 90.1% ac-
curacy on IMDB’s test data.
We use Algorithm 1 to generate adversarial text. For
each dataset, we construct a list of valid replacements for
each word in the vocabulary by setting the edit-distance
threshold to 2. First, we show how to control the polarity
and confidence of sentiment prediction by varying the
number of words replaced in a text.
We chose the first 1,000 correctly classified texts in the
test datasets for both RT and IMDB as the targets for our
attack. We set the model failure criterion to be the confi-
dence score lower than 0.1 to 0.5 for RT and 0.01 to 0.05
for IMDB. The average proportion of words we need to
replace in a text and the corresponding confidence score
of the model prediction are shown in Fig. 5. For the RT
dataset, we can change the score for the original label to
a value below 0.1 (equivalently, over 0.9 for the opposite
label) by replacing 30% of the text on average. For the
IMDB dataset, many fewer words need to be replaced:
by changing only 1% to 2% of the text, we can cause the
score for the original label to drop below 0.01.
We now evaluate whether we can successfully carry
out this attack in the image domain. We select 250 of
the successfully attacked examples for both datasets and
render clean images based on the original texts. We then
generate adversarial examples for these texts. We set the
balance constant c to 25 and the number of iterations to
1,000. For RT, our adversarial images achieve 92% target
accuracy. As a result, the accuracy of the sentiment clas-
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Input image:
Tesseract output: Madam Secretary- I hope this note finds you and your family doing well. I’ve been following all of your activities over the last
several months. You are doing an incredible job, which I’m sure is a surprise to no one. I’m going to be in DC May 19-21. We have our annual
gathering out there with about 150 folks coming out from the Exchange. I know this is probably a long shot at best, but we are having a dinner for
our group at the Hay Adams on Thursday, May 21 and it would be a tremendous honor if you would come by and say a few words. If this doesn’t
work but you are in town, I’d love to stop by for 50 minutes to say hello. Please let me know if any of this is possible. I look forward to seeing you
soon. All my best, Jerry
(a) Example of changing information such as date, numbers and name.
Input image:
Tesseract output: On behalf of NATO, I warmly welcome President Obama’s announcement on the new US approach and commitment to the
mission in Afghanistan. President Obama’s decision to substantially decrease the numbers of US forces in the NATO- led operation is proof of his
resolve; the overall approach he laid out is a broader political strategy for success. The United States’ contribution to the NATO-led mission has
always been substantial; it is now even more important.But this is not a US mission alone: America’s Allies in NATO have shared the risks, costs
and burdens of this mission from the beginning. As the US decreases its commitment, I am confident that the other Allies, as well as our Partners
in the mission, will also make a substantial increase in their contribution. Taken together, the new force contributions from across the Alliance, as
well as the new approach agreed by all the ISAF countries, will help create a new momentum in the mission in 2010.
(b) Example of changing semantic meaning of the text.
Figure 4: Document-level attack on one of Hillary Clinton’s emails. Texts in red are the adversary-chosen targets that
Tesseract outputs even though the text in the image is different.
sifier drops from 100% to 5% when applied to the OCR
output on these adversarial images (see Fig. 6 for a suc-
cessful example). The average L2 distance for RT’s ad-
versarial examples is 3.04 per changed word. For IMDB,
our adversarial images achieve 88.7% target accuracy
and the sentiment classifier’s accuracy drops from 100%
to 0% on the OCR-recognized text. Note that the adver-
sarial images do not need to be perfectly recognized as
the targets set by the adversary, as long the OCR output
fools the sentiment classifier. The average L2 distance for
IMDB’s adversarial examples is 3.25 per changed word.
Document categorization. We now show that our at-
tack can generalize to a multi-class document categoriza-
tion task. We evaluate our attack on the 20 Newsgroup
dataset4, where the task is to categorize news documents
into topics. The original dataset contains 20 classes,
but we select a subset of 4 classes for our experiment.
We train a one-vs-all logistic regression classifier on the
bag-of-word features as the target model to attack. This
model achieves 84.7% accuracy on the test dataset.
We chose the first correctly classified 500 texts in the
test dataset to attack. Similar to the sentiment analysis
experiment, we built a list of valid word replacement
for each word in the vocabulary with edit distance be-
low 2. For each text, we generated 3 adversarial texts
that try to change the model’s output from the original
420 Newsgroup dataset is available at http://qwone.com/
~jason/20Newsgroups/.
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(a) Rotten Tomatoes (b) IMDB
Figure 5: Average proportion of changed words in each text vs. the average confidence score for the original prediction.
Input image:
Tesseract output: “On Guard!” won’t be placed in the pantheon of
too mess too the Swashbucklers but it is a whole lot of junk and you
get to see the one too the worst best actors, Daniel Auteuil, have a
whale of a good time.
Figure 6: Adversarial rendering of a movie review from
Rotten Tomatoes. The sentiment analysis model predicts
a positive score of 0.91 on the original text but only 0.07
on Tesseract’s output for the adversarial image of the
same review.
class to one of the three other classes. The results of this
attack are shown in Table 3. The percentage of modi-
fied texts (mis)classified to the adversary-chosen target
is very high for all source classes and target classes. The
proportion of words that need to be changed depends on
the original and target classes. For example, transform-
ing class 2 (religion) to other classes requires changing
more words than our transformations.
We next select 250 of the successfully attacked exam-
ples for generating adversarial images. We render clean
images based on the original texts and generate the ad-
versarial examples, setting the balance constant c to 30
and the number of iterations to 2,000. The resulting ad-
versarial images cause Tesseract to output the desired
adversarial texts with 84.8% accuracy. 86.3% of these
texts are classified to the adversary-specified target class.
The average L2 distance for these adversarial examples
is 2.56 per changed word.
Data poisoning. As described in Section 3.4, if an NLP
model is trained on OCR-processed images, adversarial
images can poison the training dataset. We evaluate this
attack on the Rotten Tomatoes dataset with a logistic re-
class 1 2 3 4
1 - 100 / 6.55 100 / 6.58 100 / 7.01
2 98.1 / 25.7 - 100 / 12.6 97.5 / 33.9
3 99.4 / 9.57 100 / 6.17 - 100 / 13.8
4 100 / 6.39 100 / 5.64 100.0 / 5.33 -
Table 3: Class transformation accuracy on the 20 News-
group dataset. Classes 1 through 4 are atheism, religion,
graphics, space respectively. An a/b entry in row i and
column j of the table means that, on average, fraction
b of the words in each text needs to be changed so that
texts from class i are misclassified by the model as class
j with accuracy a.
gression classifier.
We first train a benign model h0 on the original train-
ing data. We then generate adversarial versions for a sub-
set of the training texts. We set the model failure criterion
to confidence score below 0.1 and generate texts that will
be confidently misclassified by h0. We retrain the model
on the poisoned dataset where the adversarial texts are
substituted for the corresponding original texts. The re-
sults are shown in Fig. 7 for different fractions of the
training data replaced by adversarial texts.
We select 300 of the adversarial texts as targets for ad-
versarial image rendering. We set the balancing factor c
to 200 as the proportion of words changed in each text is
much larger (0.87 on average) than in the previous exper-
iments. The number of iterations is set to 2,000. Tesser-
act outputs the desired adversarial texts with 91.3% ac-
curacy. The average L2 distance for these adversarial ex-
amples is 2.06 per changed word.
5 Limitations
Transferability across contexts. Internal features used
by recurrent neural networks, such as the network at the
core of Tesseract’s OCR model, are context-dependent
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Figure 7: Proportion of poisoned training texts vs. classi-
fication accuracy on test data. Baseline (solid) is the per-
formance of the model trained on the clean training data
and poisoned (dashed) is the performance of the model
trained on the contaminated training data.
and vary from input to input. Therefore, how Tesseract
recognizes a particular word depends on the words sur-
rounding it.
Consequently, an adversarial image of a word which
is misrecognized by Tesseract in a particular document
cannot be simply pasted into an image of another docu-
ment. Even for the same word, adversarial images must
be rendered separately for each document. For the same
reason (context-dependent features), adversarial images
of individual letters do not transfer from word to word.
Transferability across OCR models. For basic image
classification, previous work [32, 41] demonstrated that
adversarial examples generated for one model can also
fool other models. This shows that, in principle, adver-
sarial examples can work in a black-box setting.
OCR systems are significantly more complex. They
employ multi-step image processing, which destroys or
modifies many features of the input images. Achieving
transferability is much harder in this setting.
For character-based OCR models, such as GOCR [15]
and the legacy version of Tesseract, our adversarial ex-
amples do not transfer because the input processing
pipeline is very different from the end-to-end OCR mod-
els, which are the focus of this paper. In particular,
they segment their inputs into a sequence of character-
level images, which are then fed into a machine learning
model that is not based on a recurrent neural network.
Our adversarial examples do not transfer to other end-
to-end OCR models, either, because they apply differ-
ent preprocessing to input images. For example, OCRo-
pus [38] also uses recurrent neural networks as the core
of its recognition model, but its preprocessing5 includes
binarizing each pixel in the image, which truncates 8-bit
values to 1 bit and thus destroys almost the entire adver-
5Details of preprocessing in OCRopus are described in https://
github.com/tmbdev/ocropy/wiki/Page-Segmentation
Figure 8: A physically realizable adversarial example.
This example is scanned from a printed image. Tesseract
misrecognizes it as inferiority.
sarial perturbation.
Furthermore, generating transferable adversarial ex-
amples for targeted attacks is much harder than for un-
targeted attacks [32]. Whether it is possible to achieve
transferability of targeted adversarial images across OCR
models is an important topic for future work.
Physical realizability. Recent work demonstrated robust
adversarial examples that can be feasibly realized in the
physical world and not just as digital images [5, 14, 30,
47]. These examples are generated by taking into ac-
count physical-world conditions such as lighting, scal-
ing, angle of view, etc.
Similar techniques can help generate physically realiz-
able adversarial images that work against Tesseract. We
add different levels of scaling transformations [5] to the
adversarial image during optimization and also optimize
the CTC loss to a very small value so that the model is
confident in predicting the target word. We print the re-
sulting adversarial image on A4 paper, scan it back to
digital format with DPI set to 72, and submit the scanned
image to Tesseract. Fig. 8 shows a successful example.
The L2 distance for this example is 14.3, which is 5 times
larger than the digital adversarial example in Fig. 3. In-
deed, the image is much noisier visually.
Tesseract rejects input images that it perceives as hav-
ing low quality. This presents a significant obstacle
to physical realizability because physical realizability
requires large perturbations (to survive the scanning)
which make the scanned image too noisy for Tesser-
act. Fig. 9 shows the relationship between the amount
of perturbation (measured by L2 distance) and Tesser-
act’s rejection rate, calculated on 500 images of individ-
ual words. As perturbations become more significant,
rejection rate increases. This largely foils the existing
approaches to generating physical adversarial examples,
although, as Fig. 8 shows, some of our examples succeed.
6 Mitigation
A lot of recent research [21, 30, 44, 57] has aimed to in-
crease the robustness of ML models to adversarial inputs.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no universal tech-
nique that is guaranteed to defend image analysis models
against these attacks [4].
One common way to increase the robustness of ML
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Figure 9: Amount of perturbation (measured by L2 dis-
tance) vs. rejection rate of Tesseract.
models is through adversarial training [30, 57], where
the training dataset is augmented with adversarial exam-
ples. In contrast to the standard image classification tasks
whose purpose is to label images into a relatively small,
finite number of classes or to recognize the presence of a
relatively small number of object types, potential outputs
of an OCR system include all possible character strings,
complicating the search for a comprehensive set of ad-
versarial examples to include in training.
Some assumptions about adversarial examples that are
common in the image classification literature may not
hold for the OCR models. For example, it is often as-
sumed that images that are close to each other must be-
long to the same class [16, 35]. In the natural-language
context, however, visual similarity between words does
not imply anything about their semantic proximity. Im-
ages of the same word may be very different, but two
pixel-wise similar images may depict words that are se-
mantically far away from each other. Furthermore, OCR
models such as Tesseract tolerate very little noise in their
inputs (see Section 5). Therefore, a small perturbation
of the original image may cause the model to reject it or
else correctly output a different sequence.
Adversarial examples investigated in this paper
change individual words and do not automatically guar-
antee the semantic consistency of the output as a whole.
After the adversary replaces certain words, the resulting
text may appear unnatural or logically inconsistent. In
theory, semantic checks on the output of an OCR system
can help detect attacks, but relying on humans to perform
this check—determine if the OCR output is “meaning-
ful” and, if not, compare it with the input image—would
defeat the purpose of OCR.
We are not aware of any automated system that can
check whether the text produced by OCR “makes sense.”
The output resulting from our attacks is not gibberish.
Overall, it reads like normal English text (this is not sur-
prising, because the attack only modifies a small fraction
of the words), with an occasional awkwardness or incon-
sistency. Therefore, any system for checking the seman-
tic integrity of the text would need to be very sensitive
to individual words appearing out of context. If such a
system existed, we expect that it would be prone to false
positives and vulnerable to adversarial inputs itself.
Furthermore, as Fig. 4 (a) shows, an attack can target
numbers, dates, and other data that does not affect the
semantics of the overall text. These attacks are difficult
to detect using language processing techniques.
7 Related Work
Adversarial examples for computer vision. Recent re-
search has shown that deep learning models are vulnera-
ble to adversarial examples, where a small change in the
input image causes the model to produce a different out-
put. Prior work focused mainly on image classification
tasks [10, 16, 41, 50], where the input is a fixed-size im-
age and the output is a class label. Carlini and Wagner
demonstrated an attack that improves on the prior state of
the art in terms of the amount of perturbation and success
rate [10]. Their method of generating adversarial exam-
ples is designed for classification problems and cannot
be directly applied to OCR models.
The Houdini approach [12] is based on a family of
loss functions that can generate adversarial examples for
structured prediction problems, including semantic seg-
mentation and sequence labeling. Houdini is tailored for
minimizing the performance of the model, as opposed to
constructing targeted examples, and is not ideal for tar-
geted attacks against OCR that aim to trick the model
into outputting a specific text chosen by the adversary.
Adversarial examples have been demonstrated for
other computer vision tasks, such as semantic segmen-
tation and object detection [60], visual question answer-
ing [61], and game playing [24]. These approaches are
based on model-specific or task-specific loss functions
for generating adversarial examples and cannot be di-
rectly applied to OCR models.
Adversarial examples for NLP. Just like computer vi-
sion models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations
in the image domain, NLP models, too, are vulnera-
ble to adversarial perturbations in the text domain. An
adversary can substitute words in the input text to fool
many text classification model [36,43,45,65]. These ap-
proaches require careful word-level substitution, which
limits the performance and power of the attack.
Generating adversarial natural text is harder than gen-
erating adversarial images. Because of the discrete na-
ture of text, each word carries much more semantic
meaning than each pixel in an image. It is difficult to
design an attack that modifies words in a way that would
not be noticed by a human.
When NLP models operate on the output of OCR
models, the attack surface is much larger. The adversary
can operate in the image domain and transform pixels as
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needed. He still has to generate targeted attacks against
the OCR model that cause it to output specific character
strings, but in many scenarios he does not need to ensure
that these strings are syntactically or semantically cor-
rect as long as they have the desired effect on the NLP
model that consumes them. This significantly increases
the power of adversarial examples. Whereas most prior
work is concerned only with the classification error of
the NLP model, our attack gives the attacker full control
over the model’s predictions and its confidence.
Recent work has also shown that small modifications
to words such as adding random characters and intro-
ducing typos can degrade the performance of models for
NLP tasks such as classification and machine transla-
tion [6, 23, 46]. These modifications can be easily in-
tegrated with our attack because their core idea is to pro-
duce visually similar words that a human will ignore.
Adversarial examples for speech recognition. Speech
recognition is similar to OCR in the sense that it, too,
aims to assign a sequence of character labels to an input
(an audio recording in the case of speech recognition, an
image in the case of OCR). Prior work has shown how to
generate mangled, unintelligible, and even inaudible au-
dio inputs that are nevertheless recognized as commands
or speech by speech recognition systems [9, 58, 64]. By
contrast, we do not aim to generate incomprehensible in-
puts. Our goal is to generate images that have the visual
appearance of human-understandable text yet are recog-
nized as a different, attacker-specified text.
Most recent results on adversarial examples for speech
recognition (developed concurrently with our work) in-
clude targeted attacks that are close to clean audio in-
puts [11]. In this case, the attacker can set the target to
any desired output; in our case, the targets are limited to
the words that are somewhat visually similar to those in
the original clean image.
A key distinction between the speech recognition
models and optical recognition models is that the for-
mer are explicitly designed to work in noisy environ-
ments [3, 18]. Therefore, speech-to-text models accept,
and attempt to transcribe, sound recordings with minor
squeaks and noises that do not affect human perception
(and as prior work has shown, even sounds that are un-
intelligible to humans). By contrast, Tesseract rejects in-
puts with relatively minor perturbations—see an exam-
ple in Fig. 10. This greatly limits the space of feasible
adversarial examples for OCR models.
Furthermore, the alphabet for the label sequences pro-
duced by the speech recognition models has size of 26,
corresponding to 26 English characters. The alphabet
for Tesseract’s outputs is 110, which includes upper-
and lower-case English characters, numbers, and special
symbols. Larger alphabets make targeted attacks harder.
Figure 10: This adversarial example is rejected by
Tesseract even though its L2 distance to the clean image
is only 2.34.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
We demonstrated that OCR systems based on deep learn-
ing are vulnerable to targeted adversarial examples. Mi-
nor modifications to images of printed text cause the
OCR system to “recognize” not the word in the image but
its semantic opposite chosen by the adversary. This en-
ables the adversary to craft adversarial documents whose
meaning changes after they pass through OCR. Our at-
tack also has a significant impact on the NLP applica-
tions that use OCR as a preprocessing step, enabling the
adversary to control both their output and their reported
confidence. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
instance of adversarial examples against sequence label-
ing models in the image domain.
The adversarial examples in this paper were developed
for the latest version of Tesseract, a popular open-source
OCR system based on deep learning. They do not trans-
fer to the legacy version of Tesseract, which employs
character-based recognition. Transferability of adversar-
ial images across different types of OCR models is an
open problem.
Physical realizability, i.e., whether it is possible to
create physical documents whose meaning changes after
they are scanned and processed by OCR, is an interesting
topic for future research. In Section 5, we demonstrated
that some of our adversarial examples are physically re-
alizable. In general, however, image perturbations that
are sufficiently large to survive the scanning exceed the
amount of noise that Tesseract can tolerate in its input
images. It remains an open question how to develop ad-
versarial perturbations for printed natural text that (a) are
small enough so they affect only a single word, (b) do
not significantly change the appearance of this word to a
human reader, (c) yet are large enough so they are pre-
served when the image is scanned by a commodity scan-
ner, and (d) cause the OCR system to output a different
word chosen by the adversary.
Acknowledgements. Thanks to Tom Ristenpart for sug-
gesting that OCR systems should be vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples and to Jasmine Kitahara for experiments
with adversarial images of digits. This work is partially
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